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LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF STATE LABOR INJUNCTIONS
WHERE POWER TO ENJOIN IS SUBSEQUENTLY
HELD TO HAVE BEEN PREEMPTED
Twice during the 1959 term the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari
for the consideration of an issue which may have serious implications for federal
preemption in labor disputes.' That issue is whether a union which has violated
a temporary state injunction prior to a determination that power to issue it has
been preempted by Congress is immune to contempt proceedings after such a
determination has been made.2
The traditional equity rule is that although a merely erroneous order must
be obeyed, an order issued by a court which lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the dispute is void and may be disobeyed with impunity.3 Since the
Supreme Court has cast its preemption doctrine in terms of "a withdrawal of
jurisdiction" from state courts, the traditional rule implies that those temporary
injunctions of state courts which extend to federally-preempted matters may
be disobeyed with impunity.
The Supreme Court, however, in United States v. United Mineworkers,4 de-
parted from the traditional rule that an injunction issued without jurisdiction is
void. The rule of that case appears to be that a court presented with a "non-
'McCrary v. Aladdin Radio Indus., Inc., 361 U.S. 865 (1959), denying cert. in Aladdin
Indus., Inc. v. Associated Transp., Inc., 323 S.W.2d 222 (Tenn. App. 1958); Bogle v. lakes
Foundry Co., 362 U.S.'401 (1960), refu.sing to extend certiorari to the contempt aspect of Takes
Foundry Co. v. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 329 S.W. 2d 364 (Tenn. App. 1959).
The question has come up for decision in a number of recent cases in the state courts. See
E parte Dilley, Zea & Cooper, 334 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 1960); Angle v. Owsley, 332 S.W.2d 457
(Mo. 1959); Robinson v. Hoover Motor Express Co., 44 L.R.R.M. 2744 (Tenn. App. 1959);
fakes Foundry Co. v. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., supra note 1; Town and Country
Motors v. Local 328, 355 Mich. 26, 94 N.W.2d 442 (1959); Aladdin Indus. v. Associated
Transp., Inc., supra note 1; Ex park Twedell, 158 Tex. 214, 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958).
E x park Dilley, Zea & Cooper, 334 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1960); Ex park Twedell, 309 S.W.2d
834 (Tex. 1958); Angle v. Owlsey, 332 S.W.2d 457 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1959); I JoYcE, Iw-
juNcrioNs § 246 (1909); II HiGH, INJurcflONS § 1425 (1905); BRowN, JolusnicrioN § 120
(1891); 12 Am. Jux. Contempt § 26 (1938); 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 258 (1945); cases collected
in Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950).
4 330 U.S. 258 (1947). The Court, with two justices dissenting, upheld criminal contempt
convictions against Jon L. Lewis and the United Mineworkers for disobeying a temporary re-
straining order of a federal district court. The order had been issued to restrain a threatened
strike, while the court decided inter alia whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited injunc-
tive relief at the instance of the federal government, which at the time was running the coal
mines, in the same way that the act prevented private employers from obtaining such relief in
their disputes with employees.
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frivolous" or reasonable claim of jurisdiction has the power to undertake an
inquiry into the merits of that claim,5 and any orders issued to preserve the
status quo pending that investigation must be obeyed irrespective of the out-
come of the inquiry into jurisdiction.6 If the Mineworkers doctrine were applied
to state labor injunctions, it would appear that where a state court's claim of
jurisdiction was not "frivolous" the court would have "jurisdiction to determine
its jurisdiction" and its temporary injunctions 7 would be enforceable although
the issuing court was ultimately found to be without jurisdiction over the
merits.
Under the preemption doctrine, in its present stage of development, there
appear to be several situations in which a state court might be faced with what
it considers a "non-frivolous claim of jurisdiction" in a suit for a labor injunc-
tion. Included among the possible bases of such claims are the following. First,
that the labor activity sought to be enjoined involves actual or threatened
violence." Second, that there is insufficient effect on interstate commerce to meet
the NLRB's jurisdictional standards.' Third, that the dispute is primarily con-
5 "To be sure, an obvious limitation upon a court cannot be circumvented by a frivolous
inquiry into the existence of a power that has unquestionably been withheld.... In such a
case a judge would not be acting as a court. He would be a pretender to, not a wielder of,
judicial power." 330 U.S. at 310 (concurring opinion, Frankfurter, J.).
' This theory will hereinafter be referred to as the Mineworkers doctrine. It was the alternate
ground upon which three members of the Court (Vinson, C. J., Burton, J., Reed, J.) rested
affirmance of the contempt convictions in Mineworkers and was the sole ground-for two other
Justices who supported the convictions. (Frankfurter, J., Jackson, J.). Black, J. and Douglas, J.
did not reach this issue in their opinion. Murphy, J. and Rutledge, 3., in dissenting, voiced
strong opposition to this theory of judicial power. For a comprehensive discussion of this
aspect of the Mineworkers case, as well as its historical antecedents, see Cox, The Void Order
and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. Cm.L. Rnv. 86 (1948), and the cases and articles cited therein. For
early discussion of the theory propounded in the Mineworkers decision see E_ parte Wimberly,
57 Miss. 437 (1879); and VANrrLPET, COr.ATERAL ATTACK §§ 1, 66 (1892), in which the author
argues for the broader proposition that no order, temporary or final, should be subject to col-
lateral attack in any proceeding if there is even a "colorable" claim of jurisdiction in the court
which issued the order.
7This comment is limited to a consideration of the enforceability of temporary injunctions
as opposed to permanent injunctions. Neither the Mineworkers decision nor the authorities
relied on by the Supreme Court in that opinion were 6oncerned with the duty to obey a
permanent injunction. There -seems to be no rational reason for enforcing more vigorously a
temporary injunction granted before a full consideration of the jurisdiction issue than &
permanent injunction granted only after a full hearing. Nevertheless, the decisions and
language of the courts applying the Mineworkers doctrine have been restricted, on the whole,
to temporary injunctions and the traditional equity rule has gone virtually unchallenged in the
area of permanent injunctions. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1059, 1078-79 (1950). .But see Luster v.
Auxier, 285 S.E.2d 900 (Ky. 1955), whichrelied on Mineworkers to supporta final order.
For a discussion of this exception to preemption see Meltzer, The Supreine Court, Congress,
and State JTrisdiction Over Labor Relations (pt. 1),,59 CoLm. L. Rxv. 6, 26-36 (1959). The
state courts retain power to issue injunctions in labor disputes where such action is allegedly
necessary to stop current violence or to prevent future'violence. -
Under the Landrum-Griffin amendment to the LMRA, state courts have jurisdiction over
disputes involving business concerns which transact less business in interstate commerce than
certain "dollar amounts" established by the NLRB. 61 Stat. 151 (1947), as amended, 29
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cerned with the interpretation of the collective bargaining contract itself, rather
than the means of reaching that agreement.'0 Fourth, that the activity cannot
reasonably be considered either protected or prohibited by the LMRA."
This comment will first explore the considerations relevant to a choice be-
tween applying the traditional rule or the Mineworkers solution to employees and
unions who disobey state labor injunctions issued without jurisdiction although
pursuant to such a "non-frivolous claim of jurisdiction." It will then consider
whether the choice between these two courses of action is strictly a matter of
state law or if it is properly a question of federal law. Two additional solutions
which might be suggested in this situation will also be set forth and their in-
adequacies discussed.
Because the Supreme Court has not yet consented to decide any of these
issues, it is necessary to consult opinions in the state courts for judicial discus-
sion of whether the Mineworkers doctrine or the traditional equity rule should
be applied to state labor injunctions. The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in a
series of recent decisions, 12 has become the first state court to rely on the Mine-
workers theory to uphold contempt convictions for the violation of state labor
injunctions issued in the preempted area. In Aladdin Indus., Inc. v. Associated
Transp., Inc.," a manufacturer requested an injunction to compel fourteen
common carriers to resume deliveries to it. The complaint recited that the
deliveries had been curtailed because the carriers' employees had refused to
cross a picket line established by a union striking against an affiliate of the
manufacturer housed on the same premises. The trial court granted a temporary
injunction which ran against the carriers, "their officers, agents and employees."
This injunction was obeyed for approximately three months. Then the union
employees of the carriers once more refused to cross the picket line. In the ensu-
ing contempt proceeding, thirteen of the drivers and their union were adjudged
U.S.C.A. § 164(c) (Supp. 1959). Questions are likely to arise over what portion of the business
conducted by an enterprise is to be considered interstate commerce, the actual amounts
attributable to a given period, and the effect on pending litigation of a change in the amount
of interstate commerce engaged in by the employer.
10 For a discussion of this exception to preemption, see Meltzer, supra note 8, at 276-81.
The article points out inter alia the difficulties which may accompany a decision as to whether
a given dispute is merely one over contract interpretation or whether it involves prohibited
or protected labor activity.
n1 See 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1958). The scope of this
exception has been curtailed by the Supreme Court's decision in San Diego Building Trades
Council. v. Garmon, 359 (1959). It was held in that case that if the labor activity in dispute
was arguably protected or prohibited by the LMRA, the NLRB had exclusive primaryjurisdiction to decide whether state or federal power should attach. However, the Court in
Garmon left open the question of whether the state courts are free to enjoin activity expressly
held neither prohibited nor protected by the LMRA.
n Jakes Foundry Co. v. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 329 S.W.2d 364 (Tenn. App.
1959); Robinson v. Hoover Motor Express Co., 44 L.R.R.M. 2744 (Tenn. App. 1959); Aladdin
Indus., Inc. v. Associated Transp., Inc., 323 S.W.2d 222 (Tenn. App. 1958).
13 298 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. App. 1956).
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guilty of contempt. The defense that the state court's power was preempted by
the LATRA was met by the contention that such labor activity was neither
prohibited nor protected by the federal act, and thus the state court was free to
regulate it. This theory of jurisdiction was rejected by the United States Su-
preme Court in a per curiam decision14 which vacated and remanded the con-
tempt decrees.
On remand, the Tennessee court sustained the contempt decree on a new
theory of jurisdiction." It declared that the facts alleged in the complaint
created a substantial doubt as to whether the court had been without power,'6
14 McCrary v. Aladdin Radio Indust., Inc., 355 U.S. 8 (1958). The Tennessee Court of Ap-
peals was directed to reconsider the Aladdin case in the light of Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348
U.S. 468 (1955) and Union v. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 353 U.S. 968 (1957). For a critical
discussion of this per curiam disposition of the Aladdin case, see Comment, Per Cleriam
Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U.Cm.L.REv. 279, 288-303 (1958).
11 Aladdin Indus., Inc. v. Associated Transp., Inc., 323 S.W.2d 222 (Tenn. App. 1958).
16 The Tennessee Court presented two reasons for believing it had a "non-frivolous" claim
of jurisdiction over the Aladdin controversy. First, the court urged that the state court could
assume jurisdiction because it was arguable that the union activity involved was neither
protected nor prohibited by the LMRA. If a state court were to attempt to justify an injunc-
tion on such grounds now, this would probably not constitute a substantial claim of jurisdic-
tion inasmuch as the Supreme Court has announced that the NLRB, not the state courts, has
exclusive primary jurisdiction to determine whether activity is protected or prohibited by the
LMRA. San Diego Building Trades Council. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). At the time the
Tennessee trial court entered its injunction, however, Garmon had not been decided, and it was
far from clear whether the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the NLRB extended to a case such
as Aladdin in which no violation of a specific section of the LMRA was alleged by the employer
seeking the injunction. The strongest language of the Court prior to Garnwn was contained in
the Weber case: "[W]here the moving party itself alleges unfair labor practices, where the facts
reasonably bring the controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices, and where the
conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may be reasonably deemed to come within the
protection afforded by the Act, the state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the
tribunal which Congress has selected for determining such issues in the first instance." Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468, 481 (1955).
The second contention made by the Tennessee court was that, even assuming that the
state court would have clearly lacked jurisdiction because of federal preemption to enjoin the
union and its members, Aladdin did not concern an injunction against a union or its members.
It was an injunction against the carriers-an order that the court clearly did have jurisdiction
to issue. At the time the state trial court assumed jurisdiction over the case there was no possi-
bility of federal jurisdiction because the complaint was not directed against the union or
union members as such but solely against the carriers. It was urged in the Aladdin opinion that
the jurisdiction of a court must be decided on the basis of the pleadings at the commencement
of the suit and that subsequent factual revelations cannot dislodge that jurisdiction. But that
does not dispose of the question whether an injunction issued on the basis of such jurisdiction
can be enforced against parties who, if included in the original pleadings in the capacity (in
this case as union members) in which they are charged with contempt, would have ousted the
court of jurisdiction to issue the order in the first instance. In other words, it would appear im-
proper for the Tennessee Court to issue an order against the carriers, and incidentally their
employees qua employees (the Court having jurisdiction only over the carriers) and then to
enforce it against the union and its members qua members (a group against which the state
court by hypothesis lacked power to issue such an injunction). To ratify such a line of reason-
ing would enable plaintiffs and courts to accomplish by indirection what they were prohibited
from doing directly, and thus to exercise power over parties and subject matter beyond the
boundaries of their jurisdiction.
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and that pending a resolution of that question, the state trial court had jurisdic-
tion to issue a temporary injunction which the employees were bound to obey.
The defendant employees again petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. This time the Court denied the petition7 thereby passing up its first
opportunity 8 of the 1959 term to resolve the issue of whether state labor injunc-
tions are to be enforceable irrespective of any subsequent finding on the jurisdic-
tion of the issuing court.
To support its application of the Mineworkers doctrine the Tennessee court
referred to several state decisions allegedly demonstrating that this was the law
in Tennessee 9 and then cited the series of federal decisions20 culminating in
Mineworkers. Of all the cases mentioned by the Tennessee Court only the Mine-
workers decision itself fully. discusses the rationale underlying this doctrine. In
that decision, the fundamental policy was articulated in terms of preserving
respect for courts and encouraging obedience to court orders. It was urged that
permitting disobedience under any circumstances to any court order-including
one issued pending a determination of the court's power to act-would tend to
incite disrespect and disobedience toward all judicial orders. 21
In striking contrast to the position of the Tennessee Court of Appeals and
the policy expressed in Mineworkers, is the decision of the Michigan Supreme
7 McCrary v. Aladdin Radio Indus., Inc., 361 U.S. 865 (1959).
18 The second opportunity was in Bogle v. Jakes Foundry, 362 U.S. 401 (1960).
19 It is questionable whether these cases actually justify a finding that the Mineworkers
doctrine was ever a part of Tennessee law. In Weidner v. Friedman, 126 Tenn. 677, 151 S.W.
56 (1912), the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed an injunction against some "disorderly
houses" but upheld contempt convictions against the owners for their disobedience while the
case was pending on appeal. However, it was not held that the injunction was void for lack of
jurisdiction in the issuing court but merely that it was an improvident exercise of such juris-
diction. The Tennessee Supreme Court in Weidner felt that the Chancellor should have
exercised forbearance in the exercise of his equity powers. Upholding contempt convictions
for disobedience to an improvidently issued injunction is clearly consistent with the traditional
equity rule. See 43 C.J.S. Injtnctions § 258 (1945). State v. Ragghianti, 129 Tenn. 560,167 S.W.
689 (1914) is distinguishable on the grounds that the lack of notice was held not to go to the
ju'risdiction of the court. In Howell v. Thompson, 130 Tenn. 311, 170 S.W. 253 (1914), it was
held that supersedeas would not be granted to vacate an injunction issued by a court lacking
jurisdiction of the'subject matter. However, it was also stated by the court in that case that
supersedeas might be granted to prevent enforcement of such an injunction.
. In Churchwell v. Callens, 36 Tenn. App. 119, 252 S.W.2d 131 (1952), the court clearly had
jurisdiction in the case. The only reference to the contempt problem was a dictum which ad-
hered to the classical equity rule, making no mention of the Mineworkers doctrine. Id. at 133.
2D United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906); Carter v. United States, 135 F.2d 855 (5th
Cir. 1943). Cf. Howat v., State of Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922).
21 Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote an eloquent statement of this policy in his concurring
opinion in-Mineworkers: "No one ..,. can be-judge in his own case. That is what courts are for.
And no type of-controversy is more peculiarly fit for judicial determination than a controversy
that calls into question the power of a court to decide.
"If one man can -be allowed to determine for himself what is law every man can. That
means first chaos, then tyranny." 330 U.S. at 308-09, 312.
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Court in Town & Country Motors v. Local Union 32V12 The situation in Town
& Country Motors involved at least as substantial a claim of jurisdiction as did
that in the Aladdin case. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Guss v. Utah
Labor Relations Boarda a Michigan trial court had entered a temporary re-
straining order against organizational picketing of the plaintiff's automobile
agency. It took this action on the grounds that the enterprise did not meet the
NLRB's jurisdictional standards and consequently that the latter would not
take cognizance of the dispute. At that time, it was unclear whether failure to
meet NLRB standards placed the dispute within the purview of the state
courts.20 4 Shortly after the restraining order was issued the union disobeyed it. A
contempt action was then initiated against the union. Not until several months
later did the Guss decision resolve the issue of state authority to act in the no-
man's land by holding that state courts were precluded from entering this area.2 5
These facts presented a strong basis for the contention that, irrespective of
the validity of the underlying restraining order, the union's disobedience should
have been punished. When issued and ignored by the union, the order was con-
sistent with many state decisions6 and with the official position of the NLRB7
Clearly, it presented a "non-frivolous" claim of jurisdiction. In justifying its
refusal to allow the enforcement of the restraining order,28 the Michigan Su-
preme Court discussed the potential dangers which, in its opinion, made
mandatory a reversal of any contempt conviction resulting from disobedience of
a state injunction in the preempted area.
The court first pointed to the history of the employer-initiated "temporary"
labor injunction and its manifold abuses 9 A temporary injunction, allegedly
- 355 Mich. 26, 94 N.W. 2d 442 (1959).
23 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
24 Among those cases which had taken the same position as the Michigan court were:
Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 45 Cal.2d 657, 291 P.2d 1 (1955); Building
Trades Council v. Bonito, 71 Nev. 84, 280 P.2d 295 (1955); Hammer v. Local 211, United
Textile Workers, 34 NJ.Sup. 34, 111 A.2d 308 (1954); Dallas General Drivers v. Jax Beer Co.,
276 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
25 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957). Accord: Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
26 See note 24 sapra.
27 Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1. This
position was noted in the dissenting opinion in Guss: "The Court's interpretation of the pro-
viso is contrary to the established practice of the states and of the National Board, as well as
to the considered position taken by the Board as amicus curiae." 353 U.S. at 18.
28 The Michigan court reversed the restraining order and refused to "remit to the (trial)
court the fruitless task of ascertaining whether or not certain acts of the defendants constituted
a 'contempt' of the void order." 355 Mich. at 54-55, 94 N.W.2d at 457.
2 A dramatic example of how "non-temporary" such "temporary" injunctions can be is
furnished by Angle v. Owsley, 332 S.W.2d 457 (Kan. City. Ct. App. 1959). In that case a union
leader was cited for contempt in 1959 for disobeying a "temporary" injunction issued over
eight years previously in 1951.
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issued to maintain the status quo, often had the effect of breaking a strike.30 The
court found in the legislative history of the federal labor acts a clear purpose to
bar such employer-initiated injunctions from the area preempted by the na-
tional labor policy.-" The Michigan court then argued that this congressional
purpose would be thwarted by the encroachment of employer-initiated state
labor injunctions on the federal area if disobedience of these injunctions were
punished irrespective of lack of state jurisdiction. 32 National uniformity in the
field of labor policy would also suffer because of differences among the state
courts as to the outer limits of the federally preempted area, and in their willing-
ness to act in disputes potentially infringing on that area.3
The fears expressed by the Michigan court concerning the effective applica-
tion of the national labor policy if the Mineworkers theory were activated in the
area of state labor injunctions would appear to be justified. Although the
Norris-LaGuardia Act has virtually eliminated the employer-initiated tempo-
rary labor injunction from the federal courts, 34 the threat of state court injunc-
tions remains.3 5 Often granted without a hearing, on dubious allegations of fact
and law, such temporary injunctions are immune from direct attack in the
federal courts.3 Since they are interlocutory orders, in some states they are not
appealable even in the state courts."
The effectiveness of the Supreme Court's preemption doctrine in excluding
such state interferences from certain areas of labor relations would probably be
10 "The (temporary labor) injunction cannot preserve the so-called status quo; the situa-
tion cannot remain in equilibrium awaiting judgment upon full knowledge. The suspension of
activities affects only the strikers; the employer resumes his efforts to defeat the strike, and
resumes them free from interdicted interferences. Moreover, the suspension of strike activities,
even temporarily, may defeat the strike for practical purposes and foredoom its resumption,
even if the injunction is later lifted." FRANKFURTER & GREENE, TNm LABOR INJUNCTION
201 (1930), quoted with approval, 355 Mich. at 50-51, 94 N.W.2d at 454-55.
31355 Mich. at 53-54, 94 N.W.2d at 455-56. "The legislative history of the amendment of
the act in 1947 makes clear that the Congress continued to reject the scheme of relief at the
instance of employers though it imposed new limitations on the activities of unions." 355
Mich. at 52, 94 N.W.2d at 455.
1 355 Mich. at 52, 94 N.W.2d at 455.
3 3355 Mich. at 54, 94 N.W.2d at 456.
3 4 
"While there have been injunctions in the Federal courts against labor unions, the num-
ber of such orders has greatly decreased since enactment of the Norris-La Guardia Act. By the
end of 1931 ... at least 508 injunctions had been issued in labor-management disputes by
Federal courts .... This number is to be contrasted with the 66 Federal injunctions discovered
... since January 1, 1933." STAFF OF SUBcoMr. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, SENATE
Com. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, Report on State Court Injunctions, S. Doc. No. 7,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1951).
3- "There has occurred a far lesser decrease in the number of injunctions issued in the State
courts against unions on the suit of employers than in the Federal Courts." Id. at 5.
'
6 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955). For
further discussion of this matter, see notes 58-65 infra and accompanying text.
37 E.g., Robinson v. Hoover Motor Express Co., 44 L.R.R.M. 2744 (Tenn. App. 1959).
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greatly diminished by the adoption of a policy which required obedience to all
injunctions issued by state courts having a colorable claim of jurisdiction.3 8
First, employers might be encouraged to seek more injunctions in the state
courts by framing complaints presenting some claim of jurisdiction, possibly
omitting any facts which would automatically oust the state court from jurisdic-
tion. Secondly, some state courts, which have often shown themselves to be
sympathetic to the granting of temporary injunctions whether they were firmly
convinced of their own jurisdiction or not,3 9 might look favorably on these com-
plaints and issue a greater number of such injunctions. The courts would know
that their orders must be obeyed even though they actually lacked power to
determine the issue on the merits. Therefore, it might be reasonable to antici-
pate a significant increase in the number of employer-initiated state injunc-
tions. 40 Similarly, the probability that employees would obey such injunctions
would be greatly increased since the employees would realize that they would
be guilty of contempt even if it were later concluded that the state court
lacked power to determine the dispute on the merits. The interference of state
courts, and thus the imposition of state policies in the province of federal labor
regulation, would be limited only by the ingenuity that employers could dis-
play in contriving new means of presenting a "non-frivolous" claim of jurisdic-
tion in their allegations. 41
Consequently, it would appear that the integrity of federal labor policy may
be seriously jeopardized by allowing state courts to invoke the Mineworkers
theory in support of their temporary injunctions in labor disputes, and that a
rejection of the Mineworkers doctrine in this type of dispute would be justified.
But while the federal interest in effectuating its labor policy must be recognized,
it cannot be denied that the states also have a considerable interest in maintain-
8 "The procedure urged would, as a practical matter, mean the end of the federal pre-
emption of the field and the utter nullification of clear congressional intent that there be na-
tional uniformity of treatment of this complex social and economic problem." 355 Mich. at 54,
94 N.W.2d at 456.
19 E.g., "If we rule against jurisdiction and we are wrong in so ruling, the unsuccessful
litigant may well be irreparably harmed. We are of the mind that any doubt should be resolved
in favor of jurisdiction, leaving to the Supreme Court to finally resolve the matter." Pleasant
Valley Packing Co. v. Talarico, 5 N.Y. 2d 40,47, 177 N.Y.S.2d 473, 478 (1958).
40 For an excellent discussion of the many factors other than enforceability which influence
the number of injunctions sought and issued, see Report on State Court Injunctions, supra
note 34 at 4-12.
4t Some indication of the readiness of employers in certain regions of the country to avail
themselves of any opportunity to gain an injunction is supplied by the two Tennessee cases
since Aladdin which were brought on an identical claim of jurisdiction, with a complaint
directed, as in Aladdin, against the carriers rather than the union or the employees. Jakes
Foundry Co. v. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 329 S.W.2d 364 (Tenn. App. 1959), Robin-
son v. Hoover Motor Express Co., 44 L.R.R.M. 2744 (Tenn. App. 1959). For a list of addi-
tional cases recently brought on a similar claim of jurisdiction in the trial courts of Tennessee,
see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brief for Petitioner, p. 18 n.12, McCrary v. Aladdin Indus.,
361 U.S. 865 (1959).
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ing respect for their courts. A balancing of these competing federal and state
interests would have to be undertaken to properly decide between the alterna-
tives of invoking the Mineworkers doctrine or permitting disobedience when the
state courts lack jurisdiction.
The foregoing discussion has been devoted to the question of whether dis-
obedience should be punished. The next problem which must be confronted is
whether state or federal law is to be determinative of this issue. It was argued
by the employer's counsel in the Aladdin case42 that the enforceability of state
court injunctions, whether issued with or without jurisdiction, is solely a
matter of state law.43 Under this theory, if state law follows the Mineworkers
doctrine, the federal question of whether power to issue the underlying injunc-
tion has been preempted is never reached in the contempt case because the
contempt order is enforceable even if power to issue the injunction has been
preempted. If this argument were accepted, the Supreme Court might be pre-
cluded from reviewing the state contempt conviction, inasmuch as that convic-
tion would rest on adequate non-federal grounds.44 This was the argument ad-
vanced by the employer's counsel in urging that the Supreme Court should
deny certiorari in Aladdin.45
The foregoing argument presupposes that power to issue the contempt order
itself is not, or at least should not, be subject to preemption. Some of the possible
obstacles to the effective operation of the federal labor program, which such
contempt orders create, have already been discussed.45 An additional obstacle
would be added if each state were allowed to apply its own law concerning the
enforceability of injunctions issued without jurisdiction. It would tend to
sabotage the national uniformity which the federal labor relations program is
designed to promote. Some states would apply the traditional equity rule and not
4 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brief for Respondents in Opposition, p. 9, McCrary v.
Aladdin Indus., 361 U.S. 865 (1959).
43 Assuming that the question of whether the Mieworkers doctrine is to be applied at all
to state court labor injunctions is a state question, certain subsidiary problems might still
arise as to whether there are any federal limitations on state application of that doctrine in this
area. (1) If the state law so provided, could a state court support a contempt conviction by
invoking the Mineworkers doctrine even though it did not have a "non-frivolous" claim of
jurisdiction? (2) Even if the state law required that its courts have a "non-frivolous" claim of
jurisdiction before invoking that state's version of the Mineworkers doctrine, would the "non-
frivolous" nature of that claim be measured against a state or federal standard of"frivolity"?
(3) Would the state court ruling that it had a "non-frivolous" claim of jurisdiction be final, or
would that aspect of the contempt conviction at least, be reviewable by the Supreme Court.
44 "[Wihere the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal
and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is inde-
pendent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment." Fox Film Corp. v.
Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). Accord: McCoy v. Shaw, 277 U.S. 302 (1928); Petrie v.
Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist., 248 U.S. 154 (1918); Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 257 (1871).
45 "The decision of the Tennessee Court of Appeals rests solidly on the adequate non-federal
ground .... Accordingly the petition for certiorari should be denied.... ." Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Brief for Respondents in Opposition, at 9.
46 See notes 34-41 supra and accompanying text.
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punish disobedience of preempted injunctions; others would invoke the Mine-
workers doctrine and punish similar acts which violated similar injunctions;
and even among those states which invoked the Mineworkers doctrine there
would be different standards for determining what constituted a "non-frivolous
claim of jurisdiction." Consequently any uniformity achieved in excluding state
injunctions from certain areas would be subverted by a lack of uniformity in the
fate met by contempt decrees in those areas.
Because of this potential impact on the federal labor relations program, it
would seem that the issue of the enforceability of preempted state labor injunc-
tions is invested with considerable federal interest. So long as the state order,
whether it is an injunction or a contempt order, could potentially interfere with
the objectives of the federal labor program it would appear susceptible to pre-
emption 7 and thereby to review in the federal courts. 48 But whether these
contempt orders should be preempted hinges again on the balancing of this
federal interest against the state interest in enforcing their labor injunctions ir-
respective of jurisdiction. 49
If the entire area were held to be preempted by the federal government, it
would then be the federal law concerning the enforcement of temporary in-
junctions which would control the resolution of the contempt issue. In this con-
nection it is well to remember that the Mineworkers case involved only an in-
terpretation of the equity powers of the federal district courts. A conflict be-
tween federal and state policies was not in issue. Therefore, Mineworkers does
not necessarily imply that a state court can impose an absolute duty to obey
its orders when to do so has serious implications for a program of the federal
government. 0 If federal law provides the relevant standard, it would appear
47This was the view of the Michigan Supreme Court in Town and Country Motors:"Where
.. the National Labor Relations Act pre-empts the fielt and exclusive jurisdiction is vested
in the NLRB, both authority to enjoin within the pre-empted area and to punish for contempt
of the null injunction are denied the State by the Federal act." 355 Mich. at 55, 94 N.W.2d at
457 (Emphasis supplied).
48 Federal preemption of state court labor injunctions would have little meaning if it could
be circumvented by the enforcement of preempted injunctions merely because an adequate and
independent state ground existed for such enforcement. "Controlling and therefore supersed-
ing federal power cannot be curtailed by the State even though the ground of intervention be
different than that on which the federal supremacy has been exercised." Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
49 This same issue could also be framed in the fictive language of "congressional intent."
The issue would then be whether Congress in enacting its labor legislation "intended" to
nullify contempt orders issued in labor disputes withdrawn from state power in the same way
that it has nullified injunctions issued in such disputes.
" Mineworkers, the issue was whether the federal courts had jurisdiction over the dispute
or if they were prohibited from acting by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The case did not involve
a question of which of two court systems had jurisdiction to enjoin but rather whether any
court had such power. In a similar state injunction case, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted
the absence of any issue of federalism. "In that [Reid v. Independent Union of All Workers,
200 Minn. 599, 275 N.W.300 (1937)] case there was no conflict between state and federal
courts .... Much the same was true in the case of United States v. United Mineworkers."
Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 98, 46 N.W.2d 94, 99 (1950).
19601 COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
that the Supreme Court remains free, despite its Mineworkers decision, to adopt
the traditional equity rule as the federal law to be applied to contempt orders
arising out of state labor injunctions.
Before concluding that the state courts or the Supreme Court must choose
either one of the competing policies-the federal labor policy or the state
judicial policy-at the expense of the other, two possible alternative solutions
which would seek to accommodate these competing policies should at least be
considered. One of these proposals would permit disobedience when, and only
when, the employees subject to the injunction were in imminent danger of
suffering an irreparable loss of position if they continued to obey the injunc-
tion." The other approach would seek to avoid placing the employees in the
position of being forced to choose between disobedience of the state injunction
and "losing the strike" by securing a review of the question of the jurisdiction
of the state court by a federal tribunal before any irreparable harm could ensue
to the employees.1
2
The first of these proposed solutions would substitute for the absolute
duty to obey a requirement of reasonable compliance: the duty to obey only
until further obedience would result in irreparable harm to the employees' posi-
tion in the labor dispute. This is a compromise which offers to the state courts a
measure of obedience. But when the duty to obey begins to conflict with other
important interests, the defendant would be free to risk his evaluation of the
court's jurisdiction against the court's own opinion and to disobey the state
order. This is essentially the proposal espoused in a leading article 3 discussing
the Mineworkers decision. To justify an act of disobedience, according to this
formulation, the employees would have to demonstrate both that further
compliance with the temporary injunction would have resulted in irreparable
harm, and that prior to disobeying they had exhausted all available means of
securing a reversal of the order through legal channels.5 4
One major defect prevents this approach from offering a practical solution to
the problem of state labor injunctions: the criteria of this formula are too vague.
It would be difficult for the defendant employees to know when they were
faced with what a court would later find to constitute irreparable harm." In
effect, the only safe course of action, from the employees' point of view, would
be absolute obedience. From absolute obedience would flow the same dangers
51 See notes 53-56 infra and accompanying text.
52 See notes 58-65 infra and accompanying text.
53 Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 86 (1948).
54 Id. at 113.
55 Indicative of the many problems inherent in an attempt to measure "irreparable harm"
is the difficulty presented by a sympathy strike. In such a situation it is the interest of another
union, not the union against which the injunction is directed, which is threatened by con-
tinued obedience to the injunction. It would be difficult to discern any direct harm to the
enjoined union, much less "irreparable harm."
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to the federal labor program and the interests it seeks to protect as were
described above."
The second proposal would involve a procedure for securing prompt review
by a federal tribunal of the state court's power to act in the labor dispute, im-
mediately after the issuance of the temporary injunction. If the federal tribunal
found that the state injunction impinged upon the preempted area, it would
restrain further proceedings in the state court. This solution would require abso-
lute obedience by the employees to the state court injunction. But it would
afford a means of securing a review of the state court's claim of jurisdiction
before a federal tribunal shortly after the granting of the state injunction. As-
suming that this review could be accomplished before the state injunction
seriously impaired the employees' position, this suggestion has several advan-
tages. Employees would not be forced to flaunt court orders in order to ascertain
and preserve their rights. The federal government would gain an opportunity to
acquire jurisdiction and impose its policies in the dispute while those policies
could still exert practical influence on the outcome. An orderly response to state
labor injunctions could thereby be achieved without sacrificing the effectiveness
of the national labor relations program. 7
Despite these advantages, this proposal probably remains only a theoretical
alternative-not a practical possibility-since no procedure currently exists for
achieving a sufficiently prompt review before a federal tribunal of the jurisdic-
tion of state courts in labor disputes. The Supreme Court, in Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Ricman Bros. Co.,"s explicitly held that employees are fore-
closed from directly petitioning the federal courts for relief from state labor in-
junctions. In the same opinion, the Court suggested, however, that the seeking
of a state court injunction by an employer in an area preempted by federal law
might constitute an unfair labor practice cognizable by the NLRB.P But the
NLRB has not followed this suggestion. The Board recently overruled one of its
pre-Richinuz cases and held that an employer's attempt to obtain a state labor
5" See notes 34-41 supra and accompanying text.
57 Of course, this proposal is subject to criticisms in even its most ideal form. (1) If the first
federal tribunal which hears the case upholds the state court claim of jurisdiction, any later
reversal of that initial finding would probably be of little avail. On the other hand, the federal
government would at least have had an opportunity to interpose its policies at an early stage
of the dispute. In most instances in which federal jurisdiction is proper the initial federal
tribunal would probably make a correct determination and take action to enjoin the state
order. (2) The states might object to the interference of a federal tribunal in state court pro-
ceedings. One answer to this objection is that the federal interest in gaining an early resolution
by a federal tribunal of state jurisdiction in labor disputes may outweigh any irritation that
this process may cause to state courts.
58 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
5 "flit has not yet been determined that, if an employer resorts to a state court in relation
to conduct that is obviously taken over by the Taft-Hartley Act... it may not.., give
ground[s] for a finding of an unfair labor practice." Id. at 520.
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injunction could not constitute an unfair labor practice. 0 And the reluctance
of the NLRB is not the only obstacle to effective review of state labor injunc-
tions as unfair labor practices. The Supreme Court's suggestion extended only
to injunctions obviously in excess of state power.6 It would seem that if the
state court had a colorable claim of jurisdiction it would not be acting obvious-
ly in excess of state power and an employer could not be guilty of an unfair
labor practice in seeking such a state injunction.
Even assuming that the NLRB could review any state labor injunction as a
potential unfair labor practice, it is doubtful, under the present act, that the
review could be completed, and any necessary action taken to suspend the state
injunction, before the employees' activity had been effectively curtailed. With-
out a special priority, not expressly included in the present procedures of the
NLRB,6' such a case would often not be decided by the Board until after it had
become moot. To sanction the tempting expedient of allowing the regional
counsel to seek a temporary order suspending the state court injunction pending
a decision by the NLRB, 63 would merely shift the risk of irreparable injury
from the employees to the employer should the time required for final disposition
by the N IRB be excessive. 4
Consequently, unless Congress modifies NLRE powers and procedures to
cope with this problem,6' or unless the Supreme Court reverses its Richman
decision and authorizes direct employee petitions for federal action against
state labor injunctions, it would appear that this second proposal must likewise
be discarded. What is left, then, within the framework of presently existing law,
is a choice between furtherance of federal labor policy and promoting the states'
60 Clyde Taylor Co., 45L.R.R.M. 1514,1515 (1960). This decision explicitly overruled W.T.
Carter, 90 N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950) which had held that seeking a state injunction was an unfair
labor practice if the employer's resort to the state courts was part of a bad faith scheme to
defeat union organization.
61 See note 59 supra.
6161 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(j)(1)(m) (Supp. 1959).
63 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S. C.A. § 60(1) (Supp. 1959); 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 102.84,
102.85 (Supp. 1959).
4 The backlog-of cases pending decision before the NLRB would probably be sufficient to
render any resolution of the question of jurisdiction by the NLR.B too late to be of practical
consequence in the dispute. Only by the establishment of a special priority for controversies
involving state court injunctions could this time-lag pitfall be avoided.
65 This would entail amending the LMRA in at least two respects. First, a provision would
have to be inserted granting the NLRB authority to seek injunctions against any state order
which it found to be infringing on the federal area, irrespective of whether the state court had
a colorable claim of jurisdiction. This could be accomplished either by adding a new section
specifically establishing this as a new power of the NLRB, or by explicitly adding it to the list
of employer activities which constitute unfair labor practices under the act.
Secondly, the time lag problem would have to be overcome by providing the NLRB ith
procedures.for reaching an early decision on the issue of state court.jurisdiction, Spjecial time
,riorities, similar to those granted to certain classes of cases in sections 10(j) and ,0(l) of the
present LMRA, would have to be extended to the state labor injunction problem. Preferably
the hearing of cases involving the jurisdiction of state courts should be granted a priority
superior to all other classes of cases considered by the NLRB.
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interest in effective judicial administration. Choosing the former would mean
application of the traditional equity rule by the Supreme Court;" choosing the
latter would allow the states to apply Mineworkers17 The Supreme Court may
have made the latter choice in denying certiorari in Aladdin"8 and Bogle v. lakes
Foundry.9 If the decision is yet to be made, it is submitted that the potential
effect of the enforcement of state injunctions upon federal labor relations policy
is sufficient both to render the decision a matter of federal law and to warrant
that the federal courts adopt the traditional equity rule in regard to such injunc-
tions.
6 See note 3 supra. Although this is the course of action most favorable to the employees, it
is not an ideal solution from their point of view either. First, they would be forced to risk in-
curring substantial fines and imprisonment in following their own evaluation of the state
court's power to act. Secondly, disobedience would not be available as a means of neutralizing
a state court injunction issued without jurisdiction should the state government elect to en-
force its temporary decree through direct police action-such as arresting and confining
strikers-rather than through initiating contempt actions in the courts.
67 See notes 4-6 supra, and accompanying text.
68 361 U.S. 865 (1959). 69 362 U.S. 401 (1960).
USE OF STATE STATUTES BY FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
IN EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF PROCESS
In Kappas v. Western Hills Oil, Inc.,' a federal district court interpreted Rule
4(d)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 as authorizing use of a state
statute providing for extraterritorial service of process upon a nonresident de-
fendant.3 Rule 4(d)(7) provides that it is "sufficient if the summons and com-
plaint are served... in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which
service is made for the service of summons [or] other like process upon any such
defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that
state." 4 Prior opinions have stated that 4(d) (7) must be interpreted as authoriz-
124 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
2 Congress has delegated the rule making power to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1958).
3 There has been considerable discord in the federal courts as to the situations in which
extraterritorial service is authorized by the Rules. Compare Farr v. Cia. Intercontinental De
Navegacio de Cuba, 243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957), and Giffin v. Ensign, 234 F.2d 307 (3d Cir.
1956), and Hellriegel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957), will: Heiser
Ready Mix Co. v. Fenton, 265 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1959) and Pasternack v. Dalo, 17 F.R.D.
420 (W.D. Pa. 1955), and Johnson v. Scarborough, 88 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Tex. 1949).
4 "[IThe law of the state in which service is made" might conceivably be read to mean
that the law which governs service is that of the state in which the defendant receives notice
of the action, rather than the state from which service emanates. Such a construction would
have absurd results in that each district court would be empowered to serve nationwide
process, conforming only to the state statute providing for intrastate personal service in what-
ever state the defendant might be found. Although the language of the Rule is inherently am-
biguous, the Rule makes sense only if the state law referred to is that of the state in which the
district court sits. No court has made a contrary interpretation.
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